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Abstract
Background: Current theories of interval timing assume that humans and other animals time as if using a single, absolute
stopwatch that can be stopped or reset on command. Here we evaluate the alternative view that psychological time is
represented by multiple clocks, and that these clocks create separate temporal contexts by which duration is judged in a
relative manner. Two predictions of the multiple-clock hypothesis were tested. First, that the multiple clocks can be
manipulated (stopped and/or reset) independently. Second, that an event of a given physical duration would be perceived
as having different durations in different temporal contexts, i.e., would be judged differently by each clock.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Rats were trained to time three durations (e.g., 10, 30, and 90 s). When timing was
interrupted by an unexpected gap in the signal, rats reset the clock used to time the ‘‘short’’ duration, stopped the
‘‘medium’’ duration clock, and continued to run the ‘‘long’’ duration clock. When the duration of the gap was manipulated,
the rats reset these clocks in a hierarchical order, first the ‘‘short’’, then the ‘‘medium’’, and finally the ‘‘long’’ clock.
Quantitative modeling assuming re-allocation of cognitive resources in proportion to the relative duration of the gap to the
multiple, simultaneously timed event durations was used to account for the results.
Conclusions/Significance: These results indicate that the three event durations were effectively timed by separate clocks
operated independently, and that the same gap duration was judged relative to these three temporal contexts. Results
suggest that the brain processes the duration of an event in a manner similar to Einstein’s special relativity theory: A given
time interval is registered differently by independent clocks dependent upon the context.
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Introduction
Over a century ago, Albert Einstein postulated that a given time
interval is registered differently by independent (moving) clocks
[1]. Interestingly, Einstein himself recognized the similarity
between the relativity of physical and psychological time: ‘‘When
a man sits with a pretty girl for an hour, it seems like a minute. But
let him sit on a hot stove for a minute - and it’s longer than any
hour. That’s relativity.’’ [2] Einstein was literally talking about
different temporal contexts providing different read-outs for the
same physical interval. While relative time became the de-facto
view in physics, the relativity of psychological time is still a matter
for debate. For example, neurobiological evidence suggests indeed
that major time scales (millisecond, second-to-minutes, and
circadian) are processes by different regions of the brain (e.g.,
cortex, cerebellum, striatum, and suprachiasmatic nucleus) [3], it is
still unclear whether everyday timing in the seconds-to-minutes
range is performed by a single or rather multiple parallel
mechanisms in the brain [4].
The prevalent view in cognitive theories of psychological time is
that humans and other animals time multiple durations by using a
single stopwatch with a clock stage composed of a pacemaker
whose pulses are passed through a switch into an accumulator, the
output of which is manipulated by simple arithmetic [5]. Although
some procedures are amenable to timing with a single stopwatch
that is used in a sequential manner, evidence for simultaneous
temporal processing can be found even in relatively simple timing
tasks [6–10]. For example, when rats are trained on a tri-peak
procedure in which three levers are individually associated with
different durations initiated by the onset of a single signal, the
responses on the three levers demonstrate a high degree of
independence, suggesting the use of independent clocks rather
than a single stopwatch [11,12]. This raises the question of
whether subjects use a single stopwatch whose output is
manipulated using simple arithmetic or multiple independent
clocks in order to time multiple durations concurrently. Assuming
for the moment a ‘‘pacemaker-switch-accumulator’’ model, it is an
open question as to whether the same pacemaker could be used to
generate pulses that are then switched into multiple accumulators
or whether the observed independence would also require the
equivalent of multiple pacemakers in addition to the multiple
‘‘switch-accumulator’’ components [13].
Here we investigate two direct predictions of the view that time is
represented relative to multiple independent clocks: (a) that these
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independently, and (b) that these clocks create separate temporal
contexts by which any given duration is judged, such that the same
duration is judged differently by each of these clocks, in line with
Einstein’s insight. We addressed these questions in a tri-peak
procedure by challenging rats with unexpected retention-intervals
(gaps).
When unpredictable, infrequent gaps interrupt a timed signal,
subjects behave as if they run, stop,o rreset their clocks [14–17]. In
the run mode, subjects ignore the gap and continue timing, in the
stop mode they retain the time prior to the gap and resume timing
after the gap, and in the reset mode the time prior to the gap is
lost, and subjects re-start timing after the gap anew. In the tri-peak
procedure, we expected gaps to reveal the use of a single master
clock or of multiple independent clocks. Should subjects use the
same rule on all three durations it would implicate a single
stopwatch; should they use different rules on the three durations—
say run for one duration, stop for the second, and reset for the
third—it would implicate separate clocks that can be manipulated
independently, because such an output can not be obtained by
manipulating the output of a single clock whose sequential
operation would lack independence. We sought separate measures
of independence of these putative clocks by analyzing the average
response rates over several trials, as well as the pattern of
responding during individual trials. During individual trials, the
times when subjects switch from a low-state to a high-state of
responding, s1, and from a high-state to a low-state of responding,
s2, the difference in these times, d=s22s1, and the midpoint of
these times, m=(s2+s1)/2, have all been shown to be valuable in
elucidating properties of the interval-timing system [18,19].
Despite extensive investigation of the relationship between these
statistics for a single target duration [19–21], there has not yet
been an evaluation of the relationship of these variables across
multiple durations. Of interest for our study were the interactions
between these statistics across durations, and whether they are
consistent with a single clock, or with multiple independent clocks.
A second major goal of this study was to evaluate whether the
effect of a gap is dependent on its absolute duration – as predicted
by the use of a single stopwatch – or on its relative duration to the
temporal context in which the gap is presented [22]. For example, in a
delay-matching-to-sample-duration (DMTS-D) procedure, the
response chosen by pigeons when presented with a test interval
depends on the relative duration of the test interval to the temporal
context in which its is embedded [22], which includes (in the
DMTS-D procedure) the delay after the test interval [23] as well as
the inter-trial interval at the time of the test [24]. Therefore, by
having rats time in parallel three durations each of which acting as
a separate temporal context, we expected the effect of the gap to
depend not on its absolute duration, but on its duration relative to
the temporal context in which it is presented, i.e., relative to each
temporal criterion.
To account for the effect of the gap in the tri-peak procedure,
we extended the qualitative description of the relative-duration
hypothesis [22] to a quantitative model of the effect of retention-
intervals on timing [25–27]. Current data provide strong support
for a resource allocation model [28] suggesting that the presentation a
gap determines resources to be taken away from the timing system,
such that, left with fewer resources, the timing system fails to
maintain the current subjective time in working memory (WM),
resulting in a delay in timing [25–29]. The model addresses
manipulations of gap position, duration, and salience [8,14–
17,25–27,30–35] by assuming that during the gap resources decay
(are re-allocated) in proportion to the relative saliency of the gap to
the timed signal [25–27]. Here we extended this model to include
the relative duration of the gap to the timed signal. To further
examine the latter possibility, we conducted quantitative modeling
assuming three independent clocks whose resources are indepen-
dently re-allocated in proportion to the relative duration of the gap to
the timed signals.
Results
Response Rate Analysis
Baseline tri-peak response functions peaked around the to-be-
timed 10, 30, and 90-s criteria showing that rats acquired the tri-
peak procedure, F(2,18)=660.36, p,0.001 (Fig. 1A). Presentation
of gaps inserted into the timed signal at a constant location, 15s
from trial onset, differentially affected the response functions for
the 3 durations: a 10-s gap delayed by approximately 30s the
response function on the 10-s lever (reset rule, Fig. 1B), by
approximately 20s the response on the 30-s lever (intermediate
between stop and reset, Fig. 1C), and by approximately 10s the
response on the 90-s lever (stop rule, Fig. 1D), F(4,36)=122.84,
p,0.001. The pattern of differential effects of the same gap on the
3 criterion durations suggests that the clocks associated with these
durations can be manipulated independently. The effect of a gap
seems to increase with its relative duration to each criterion: the
effect was larger for the shorter criterion (reset, Fig. 1B) than for
the longer criterion (stop, Fig. 1D).
To dissociate whether the effect of the gap is associated with
independent clocks or rather with independent responses, we evaluated
whether manipulating the length of the gap changes the response
Figure 1. Response functions during probe trials of a tri-peak procedure (A) and during a 10-s gap trial: (B) 10-s lever, (C) 30-s lever,
(D) 90-s lever.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006268.g001
Single or Multiple Clocks
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for each lever. Plotting the obtained peak times for each criterion
as a function of the gap duration revealed a pattern of hierarchical
interaction between gap duration and criterion duration,
F(8,72)=3.16, p,0.01 (Fig. 2A-Data). A gradual increase in gap
duration resulted in a gradual reset at all temporal criteria, in an
orderly, hierarchical fashion: A 1-s gap minimally interfered with
timing (Fig. 2A-Data), a 3-s gap reset the 10-s clock, but not the
30-s and 90-s clocks (Fig. 2B-Data), a 10-s gap reset both the 10-s
and 30-s clocks, but did not affect the 90-s clock (Fig. 2C-Data),
while a 30-s gap reset all clocks (Fig. 2D-Data). This pattern or
response in which subjects tend to reset after longer gaps was
reported previously [5,14–17,30,36] and suggests that the run/
stop/reset rules are not associated with the responses (i.e., pressing
on the 3 levers), but rather associated with specific clocks.
Individual-Trials Analysis
An example of the distribution of responses on the three levers
(criteria) on an individual probe trial is shown in Figure 3. Data
from individual trials were analyzed to evaluate the following
statistics: s1, defined as the time the high response state began for a
particular target duration; s2, defined as the time that the high
response state ended; the difference of these times, d=s2-s1, and
the midpoint of these times, m=(s2+s1)/2. These statistics have all
been shown to be valuable in elucidating properties of the internal
clock [17,18].
Figure 2. Data: Observed peak times in probe trials (black dots) and gap trials (colored dots). Model: Quantitative modeling with the
resource allocation model. A: 1-s gap, B: 3-s gap, C: 10-s gap, D: 30-s gap. Red: 10-s clock, blue: 30-s clock, green: 90-s clock.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006268.g002
Figure 3. An example of the distribution of responses on the three levers (criteria) on an individual probe trial and associated
statistics. Responses (vertical dashes) are shown for each criterion (10, 30, and 90 s) as a function of time. Color (red, blue, green) and superscripts
indicate these measures for the 10, 30, and 90-s target durations, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006268.g003
Single or Multiple Clocks
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within each criterion (0.56 to 0.69), as well as for the s1:m and the
s2:m comparisons within each criterion duration (0.83 to 0.95). A
strong negative correlation was also found for the s1:d comparison
within each criterion duration (20.39 to 20.46). This pattern of
correlations has been reported previously for different groups of
rats trained on a peak-interval procedure [18]. In contrast,
correlations of measures among criteria were considerably weaker.
Weak positive correlations were found for the following compar-
isons: s1
10:s1
30 (0.15), s1
10:s1
90 (0.17), s2
10:s1
30 (0.12), s1
10:m
30 (0.10),
s1
10:m
90 (0.11), and s2
10:m
30 (0.12). All correlations reported are
significant at p,0.01; no other correlations were significant. The
pattern of strong correlations for the parameters describing
individual-trial behavior within each temporal criterion, and weak
correlations among these parameters for the various pairs of
temporal criteria, supports the proposal that independent clocks
simultaneously timed the three durations.
Quantitative Modeling
A resource allocation model of interval timing has been
previously proposed, suggesting that gaps determine resources to
be taken away from the timing system [25–27]. Previous
implementations assumed that accumulated time decays expo-
nentially during the gap at a rate proportional to the salience of
the distracter relative to the timed signal. Here we extended this
model by assuming that the decay rate is proportional to the
relative duration of the gap to each criterion duration, -salience * g/
Tk. The relative salience of the gap is considered constant in the
present simulations, but has been shown to be critical in addressing
previous data sets [25,26,35]. If the criterion duration is short, the
g/Tk ratio is large, and working memory (WM) decays fast during
the gap (reset rule); if the criterion duration is long, the g/Tk ratio is
small, and WM decays slowly (run or stop rule). Accordingly,
simulations indicate that gaps determine differential effects on
each clock, e.g., a 10-s gap resets the 10-s clock (Fig. 2C-Model red
curve), delays the 30-s clock intermediate between stop and reset
(Fig. 2C-Model blue curve), and stops the 90-s clock (Fig. 2C-
Model green curve). Moreover, increasing the duration of the gap
resets each clock in a hierarchical manner, first the 10-s clock
(Fig. 2B-Model), then the 30-s clock (Fig. 2C-Model), and finally
the 90-s clock (Fig. 2D-Model). These simulations quantitatively
and qualitatively account for the current data and provide support
for multiple independent clocks whose resources are dynamically
re-allocated based on the relative duration of the gap to each
temporal criterion.
Discussion
We found that subjects simultaneously time different intervals
using multiple independent clocks whose resources are indepen-
dently re-allocated. When an infrequent, unpredictable gap
interrupted the timed signals (Fig. 1A), rats reset the short clock,
stopped the middle clock, and ran the long clock (Fig. 1B-D)
suggesting that the three clocks were operated independently.
Such temporal control of behavior can not be accounted for by a
single clock whose output is manipulated by simple arithmetic.
Moreover, when the duration of the gap was gradually increased,
rats gradually reset their clocks at all three durations, in a
hierarchical manner, first the short- (Fig. 2B-Model), then the
middle- (Fig. 2C-Model), and lastly the long-criterion duration
(Fig. 2D-Model), indicating clock-specific rather than response-
specific operation. A resource allocation model accounted for the
data under the assumption that the multiple clocks use resources
which are independently re-allocated during the gap at rates
proportional to the ratio g/Tk between the duration of the gap, g,
and the criterion of each clock, Tk (Fig. 2A:D-Model).
Implications for Psychological Models of Interval Timing
Several models have been previously applied to interpret data
obtained in interval-timing experiments involving gaps (retention-
intervals). A switch model, assuming that during the gap time fails
to accumulate due to the opening of a stimulus-controlled switch,
predicts that, irrespective of gap and criterion durations, subjects
should use a stop rule [14,15,30,31]. In contrast, the present data
indicate that rats flexibly change their behavior with both gap and
criterion duration. An instructional-ambiguity model proposing that
subjects perceive the gap as an ambiguous, ITI-like event, predicts
that manipulations that render the gap similar to the ITI should
reset the clock, while manipulations that render the gap dissimilar
from the ITI should stop the clock [37]. Because in our experiment
the gap and ITI were identical (dark) this hypothesis predicts the
use of the same rule (reset) at all gap and criteria durations, in
contrast to the current data showing the use of different rules for
different temporal criteria. To account for the flexible use of the
run/stop/reset rules by rats and pigeons, Cabeza de Vaca et al.
[38] proposed a passive memory-decay model which assumes that
subjective time—stored in WM—decays passively during the gap.
This model predicts that the effect of a gap should depend solely
on absolute gap duration, but not on criterion duration, as found
here (Fig. 1B-D). These models can not account for the differential
effects of gaps on multiple intervals.
In contrast to these alternatives, the present resource allocation
model assumes that during the gaps resources are re-allocated
(diverted away from timing), each clock is unable to maintain its
current subjective time in WM, and the response is delayed
[16,17,27] in proportion to the perceived salience of the distracter
relative to the times signal [34,35]. Indeed, the effect of a gap is
affected by the contrast in intensity between the gap and the timed
signal [27,34,39] and by the perceptual acuity of the subjects [27].
Importantly, the predictions of this resource re-allocation model
are not restricted to retention-intervals (i.e., gaps), but extend to
distracters presented during the continuous presentation of a timed
signal. Previous data were quantitatively accounted for by
assuming that during a gap and/or distracter the accumulated
time decays at a rate that varies with the relative salience of the
distracter to the timed signal [25,26,35]. Here we found that the
comparison between the gap and the (multiple) timed signal(s)
extends to the temporal domain. Simulations indicate that both
the differential effect of the gap on multiple durations, and the
gradual hierarchical reset due to increasing gap duration can be
quantitatively accounted for assuming that the three clocks have
separate resources re-allocated independently during a gap at a
rate proportional to the ratio g/Tk between the duration of the gap
and each criterion duration (Fig. 2A:D-Model).
Implications for Neurobiological Models of Interval
Timing
Our finding that timing involves multiple independent clocks
has direct biological support from studies examining activation
firing in the striatum (STR) and prefrontal cortex (PFC) in timing
tasks [3]. When rats are probabilistically rewarded at two
durations, distinct subsets of STR neurons are activated for the
two temporal criteria [40]. Similarly, in the present task the three
criteria may have been encoded by independent STR neural
populations, differentially affected by the presentation of the gap.
Importantly, STR neurons can code multiple durations only if
PFC is intact. Lesions of the agranular frontal cortex (AgFC) or the
nucleus basalis magnocellularis [8] impair rats’ ability to time two
Single or Multiple Clocks
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sequentially [41]. Moreover, AgFC is implicated in divided
attention to multiple timed stimuli [42], and in the dynamic
allocation of attention in time [43]. These results are compatible
with our finding that gaps inserted into the signal differentially
affected the timing of the multiple temporal criteria by the means
of re-allocation of attentional or memory resources.
The above information is embedded in a neurobiological model
ofintervaltiming–theStriatalBeatFrequency(SBF)model–which
describes interval timing as an emergent activity in the cortico-
striatalcircuitsbasedonthe coincidentalactivation ofmediumspiny
neurons in STR by cortical neural oscillators [44,45]. Experience-
dependent changes in cortico-striatal transmission are assumed to
make STR neurons more likely to detect the pattern of activation of
cortical oscillators at the time of reward [46]. In the SBF model, the
activity of STR neurons increases before the expected time of
reward, and peaks at the criterion interval, a result that parallels
ensemble recordings of STR neurons in time reproduction
procedures [40], and behavior in the present study (Fig. 1A).
Moreover, the SBF model demonstrates the scalar property [44],
i.e., the widths of the response functions increase with the criterion
duration, a result evident in our experiment (Fig. 1A). In the
framework of the SBF model, the current study suggests that the
different STR neural populations, which independently code for
multiple durations, are driven by separate pools of cortical
oscillators which can be differentially stopped and/or reset.
Conclusions
We found that events are judged relative to the temporal
contexts in which they occur. Multiple temporal contexts are
coded simultaneously by multiple internal clocks that can be
independently ran, stopped, or reset by the insertion of a gap into
the signal. Quantitative modeling suggests that the multiple clocks
have separate attentional or working memory resources, which are
re-allocated independently during a gap at a rate proportional to
the relative duration of the gap to the multiple criterion durations.
These findings have direct support from studies of neural firing
during timing studies showing that timed criteria are encoded by
separate neural populations, possibly activated by independent
populations of cortical oscillators, which can be differentially
stopped/reset based on relative activity in STR and PFC. These
data extend the applicability of a relative theory of temporal
categorization involving space and time [22,47] to multiple
contexts. This perspective suggests that our brain is continuously
timing multiple events within different temporal contexts, and
represents the durations of these events not in an absolute manner,
but relative to their contexts [48].
Materials and Methods
Subjects
Ten male Sprague-Dawley rats (Charles-River Labs, Raleigh,
NC) approximately 4 months of age at the beginning of the
experiment were used as subjects. Rats were given continuous
access to water and maintained at 85% free-feeding weight by a
daily ration of rat chow (Rodent Diet 5001, PMI Nutrition
International, Inc., Brentwood, MO).
Apparatus
The apparatus consisted of 10 standard lever boxes designed for
rats (MED Associates, Inc., St. Albans, VT) housed in sound
attenuating cubicles. The lever boxes were equipped with three
response levers (two retractable and one fixed) situated on the front
wall. According to the schedule, 45-mg precision food pellets
(Bioserve, Frenchtown, NJ) were delivered in a food cup situated
on the front wall, 1 cm above the grid floor, under the center lever,
by the pellet dispenser. The to-be-timed stimulus was a 28-V 100-
mA house light mounted at the center-top of the front wall. A 66-
dB background sound produced by a ventilation fan was present
throughout the session.
Procedure
Rats learned to time multiple target durations using a version of
the tri-peak procedure [11,12,18]. Briefly, rats were trained with
three types of fixed-interval (FI) trials, interspersed randomly.
Trials began with the illumination of the house light. The first
response after the appropriate duration (10, 30, or 90s) was
reinforced with a 45 mg food pellet and the house light was turned
off for a random ITI (60630s). Following FI training, non-
reinforced probe trials, which lasted 3 times the 90-s criterion time
plus a random 0–20% (270–330s), were added to the sessions.
During testing, four non-reinforced gap trials were added to the
trial types randomly selected for. Gap trials lasted for the same
length as probe trials, except that gaps of different durations (1, 3,
10, or 30 s) were inserted into the timed signal at a constant
location (15s from trial onset).
Response Rate Analysis
The time of each lever press was recorded in 1-s bins. Response
functions were separately fitted by linear functions and by Gaussian
+ ramp functions using SigmaPlot (SPSS, Chicago, IL). The mean
of the fitted function was used as a measure of the peak time [39].
The ratio of the r
2 values from the linear and Gaussian + ramp
function was used as a measure of the temporal control exhibited by
each rat. If this ratio was greater than 0.8, the rat’s data for that
criterion duration was not used because they do not provide useful
information regarding the rat’s temporal perception. Less than 2%
of the data were excluded for this reason.
Individual-Trials Analysis
The s1, s2, d, and m parameters for each trial were estimated for
each criterion as described by Church et al [19], and correlations
among these parameters were computed for each target duration.
Responses on the short, medium, and long levers from and the 90-
s probe trials (in which the rat responded on all three levers
without reinforcement) were fit separately. For within-duration
correlations, only trials with s1 falling prior to the obtained target
duration, and s2 falling after the target duration were used, in
order to avoid forcing positive correlations [19]. For similar
reasons, for between-duration correlations only trials in which the
s2 for one target duration did not overlap with the s1 of the next
target duration were used. Fewer than 10 percent of the trials were
excluded on this basis.
Quantitative Modeling
Quantitative modeling was conducted assuming three indepen-
dent ‘‘pacemaker-switch-accumulator’’ clocks of criteria Tk,k=1 ,
2, 3, which provide three independent representations of the
subjective time. Clocks were assumed to have a common
pacemaker but independent switches and accumulators. Subjec-
tive time was assumed to accumulate independently in the three
accumulators before and after the gap at a fixed unitary rate for all
clocks, but decay exponentially during the gap at different
(independent) rates, salience /Tk, where salience is the relative
salience of the gap to the timed signal (considered constant in the
present simulations). Parameters used in all simulations: pacemaker
rate =1,salience =4,T1=10, T2=30, T3=90.
Single or Multiple Clocks
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